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Market Mechanisms, Ecological Sustainability
and Social Equity
Sharon Beder, Visiting Professorial Fellow, University of Wollongong

Market mechanisms are increasingly being used to achieve environmental protection
and economists are increasingly the ones governments turn to for advice on
environmental policy as we have seen in the case of Ross Garnaut and Australian
climate change policy. But can market mechanisms achieve ecological sustainability
and maintain social equity?
In most cases market mechanisms aim to maximise economic efficiency rather
than environmental effectiveness or equity. The use of emissions trading to reduce
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is a good case study to demonstrate this.
Emissions trading allows firms to trade the right to emit specific quantities of
greenhouse gases.
Tradeable pollution rights were originally developed in the USA to cut costs to
industry and enable economic growth to continue in highly polluted areas. Similarly,
emissions trading schemes for dealing with greenhouse gases aim to achieve a given
level of environmental protection at less cost to industry rather than maximising
environmental gains and past experience has shown that the environmental gains
from emissions trading are far from guaranteed.

ECOLOGICAL SUSTAINABILITY
Emissions trading is based on the idea that it is cheaper for some firms to reduce their
emissions than others and therefore it is more cost effective to allow the market to
decide where emission reductions will be made than for governments to require
uniform reductions across an industry. Firms that find it expensive to reduce
emissions are able to buy up emission permits instead. Those that can reduce
emissions cheaply can sell on their unwanted permits.
This might be acceptable if only limited pollution reductions are required – that
is if reductions can be limited to what can be done cheaply. However they make little
sense if substantial reductions are required. If more expensive reductions have to be
made then there is little point in setting up markets that enable some firms to avoid
making those expensive reductions so as to minimise overall costs.
This became evident in Germany when it considered implementing an acid rain
emissions programme. The aim of the German programme was a 90 percent reduction
in SO2 between 1983 and 1998. In comparison, the aim of the US emissions trading
program was only a 50 percent reduction by 2010. This meant that in the US there
was much more scope for power stations to find cheaper ways to reduce their
emissions, whereas in Germany, every power station had little choice but to retrofit
their plants with flue gas desulphurisation and selective catalytic reduction for
nitrogen oxides. This meant that there was no scope for trading in Germany.i

The US Acid Rain Cap and Trade scheme is consistently cited as a success
because it achieved emissions reductions at minimal cost but how do those reductions
compare with what can be achieved with traditional regulation? The UK
Environmental Agency noted in 2003 that sulphur emissions in the US exceeded those
from the EU Member States by 150%.ii
Even proponents of trading admit that there will inevitably be a conflict and an
implicit trade-off between the goals of reducing costs and improving environmental
quality.iii This conflict can be seen in the setting of a cap for tradeable emissions
programmes. The cap is the total amount of emissions for which permits are issued.
There are various possible reasons for choosing a particular cap. They include:
•

Environmental and health protection

•

Technical feasibility – available technology

•

Economics – balancing costs

•

Politics – influence of vested interests and political acceptabilityiv

In practice, caps tend to be based on economics and politics rather than what is
technically feasible to protect the environment and human health. This is evident in
Garnaut’s recommendations for emissions trading. Firstly he recommends two levels
of reductions for Australia, the choice of which depend on whether a post-Kyoto
international agreement is achieved. If not he recommends only a 5 percent reduction
in Australian greenhouse gases from 2000 levels by 2010. In other words the cap
should reflect political and economic reality, not what is best for the environment.v
Garnaut claims that even if an international agreement is reached, it will only
aim for global emissions to stabilise at 550 ppm (compared to current emissions of 455
ppm) of greenhouse gases and this is likely to result in 44-87 percent mortality of
coral, 8-39 percent species at risk of extinction, and 12-77 percent likelihood of
irreversible melting of the Greenland ice sheet.vi So even his more ambitious target of
ten percent reduction by 2010, is conditional on an international agreement that will
not prevent disastrous environmental consequences.
What is good for the environment is not necessarily good for encouraging trade in
a market. If the cap is set too low and too few permits are issued then there will be
little trading because firms will not have spare permits. Yet a such a low cap may be
necessary to protect the environment.
When the EU emissions trading system was introduced in 2005 analysts believed
that many governments had been too generous in allocating permits to local firms
because they feared their local industries would be at a competitive disadvantage if
they had to buy extra permits. A study by Ilex Energy Consulting for WWF examining
six EU countries found that none of them had set caps that went beyond business as
usual and would meet their agreed Kyoto obligations.vii Because allowances were not
in great demand, the market opened at 8 euros per tonne and settled around 23 euros
a few months later, far less than necessary to provide an incentive to reduce
emissions.viii Yet Garnaut is recommending permits be sold in Australia in 2010 for
only A$20 per tonne rising each year by only 4 percent.ix
Emissions trading has the potential to enable phoney reductions. The most
obvious example is the trading of emissions permits with Russia and other eastern
European countries that are in economic decline. This has meant that some countries
in Eastern Europe are already emitting 30%-45% less carbon dioxide than in 1990
because of lowered production yet they can sell their rights to emissions they were not

going to make, to other nations, in return for hard currency, with no net benefit to the
planet.x The reductions that would have occurred without emissions trading are now
available to affluent countries to avoid their own emissions reductions. They are
referred to as ‘hot air’ or ‘phantom’ emissions reductions.
In NSW the Greenhouse Abatement Scheme issued certificates to those who
reduced greenhouse gas emissions that could then be sold to electricity retailers who
had to meet mandatory emissions reductions. However a study by researchers at the
University of NSW has found that 95 percent of the certificates issued in the 18
months leading up to June 2004 were for projects established before the introduction
of the scheme and more than 70% were awarded for emissions reductions that would
have occurred anyway.xi
Even Australia’s oldest and most polluting electricity generators, based in
Victoria, were awarded certificates worth millions of dollars. A government
spokesman defended the scheme, which is predicted to cost rate payers some $2 billion
over 9 years, saying: ‘It is not possible to distinguish between production or
investment decisions made as a result of the scheme and those that would have been
made anyway’.xii
It is often argued by economists that markets are more efficient than centralised
government decision making because they automatically gather information and
ensure that supply and demand are balanced and resources allocated efficiently.
However, this sort of argument cannot be applied to artificial markets such as those
created for pollution rights since the need for monitoring and enforcement remains
and is, in fact, arguably greater. For emissions trading to work properly, the regulator
needs to know what emissions a company is making so as to check that it has
sufficient permits. Too often inspection and verification does not happen.
In the Australian scheme, according to the government’s green paper, firms
would estimate their own emissions and very large emitters would have to have their
reported emissions audited by a third party.xiii Elsewhere, this is often done by
transnational corporations such as PricewaterhouseCoopers that are also consultants
and accountants to the companies whose emissions they are auditing. ‘This can only
lead to a severe conflict of interests, resulting in fraud and ultimately little guarantee
of actual emissions reductions.’xiv
There is even more scope for cooking the books when it comes to carbon sinks,
such as tree plantations, because of the lack of accepted methods for calculating how
much carbon is temporarily taken up by growing trees. Such trees may release their
carbon early as a result of fires, disease or illegal logging so plantations need to be
monitored throughout their life cycles to ensure the carbon credits earned by planting
them are deserved, but governments are only concerned with meeting targets in a
comparatively short compliance period.xv
Emissions trading tends to protect very polluting or dirty industries by allowing
them to buy emission permits rather than meet environmental standards. In this way,
trading can reduce the pressure on companies to change production processes and
introduce other measures to reduce their emissions.
An emissions trading scheme will see the price of electricity and manufactured
goods go up but that is no guarantee that the market will invest in alternatives,
especially if polluters can pass on the extra cost to consumers, buy up environmentally
dubious offsets, or be compensated for extra costs that might damage their
international competitiveness.
Take the example of electricity generation. Currently electricity generators offer
quantities of electricity into the National Electricity Market for a particular price for

each time period the next day. If they have to pay for emission permits, their offer
price will presumably be higher. The system operator choses the cheapest electricity
for supplying the predicted demand for the next day. It only choses electricity
generated by renewable energy if it is cheaper or if there isn’t enough other electricity
available. For any significant switch to renewable energy, carbon credits have to be
expensive enough to make coal and gas-based electricity more expensive than
renewable energy. This is not going to happen given the proposed compensation for
coal power generators having to buy permits and the proposed low set price for
permits.
The oil and fossil fuel dependent companies who want to continue expanding
their businesses are the very ones that are promoting emissions trading in the
knowledge that it will enable them to continue to do this. A price of $20 per ton of
emissions is likely to increase the price of petrol by only 1 or 2 cents per litre, which is
nothing compared with daily market fluctuations in oil prices, and anyway, will be
counteracted by a reduction in the government fuel levy.

SOCIAL EQUITY
Market mechanisms impact social equity in various ways:
• through the impact of the higher prices that are supposed to provide the
incentive to change to more environmental behaviour;
• because market mechanisms shift decision making power about how the
environment is protected from the realm of politics to the market, enabling
those with most market power to have most say
• because they prioritise economic considerations and their ineffectiveness is
uncertain, which has consequences that are often felt more by disadvantaged
people.
The inequitable impacts of higher prices caused by emissions trading has been
recognised by the Australian government and it proposes to compensate poorer
households for the expected increased costs. However this will inevitably undermine
the incentive provided by the scheme for change and highlights the inability of market
mechanisms to effectively meet equity, environmental and economic concerns at once.
Even with compensation those on low incomes are less able to afford to buy new,
more energy-efficient appliances such as fridges and cars and those on higher incomes
will feel the higher prices less and may not have the incentive to become more energy
efficient. Both tenants and landlords are less likely to spend money on energy saving
measures, such as roof insulation or solar water heating, since then tenants can’t be
sure of long term returns in a house they don’t own and landlords won’t benefit from
the energy savings themselves.
Also, higher prices will only work as an incentive to change behaviour if there are
alternatives available, otherwise it just serves to penalise some sectors of the
community and is inequitable. For example, higher fuel prices have most impact on
people who have to travel long distances to get to work and don’t have access to public
transport. Since it is often the poor who are forced to live in the outer suburbs,
because that is where the cheapest housing can be found, such a measure would
impose its greatest burden on those least able to pay. People in rural areas and on the
outskirts of cities will be also worse off because of the longer distances they have to

travel. And rural industries will also be badly hit because of the longer distances and
the heavy fuel requirements of agricultural machinery.
Emissions trading puts the decisions about how emissions should be reduced into
the hands of the market. For example, the Australian scheme allows limited use of
offsets which are causing problems around the world. Those offering plantations as
offsets look for the cheapest land to grow their trees, which is often in poor countries
and often it is land that is not owned by individuals but rather occupied by indigenous
people without formal property rights. Such plantations can suck up ground water
needed by local people for their own crops and the pesticides and fertilisers used on
the plantations can pollute rivers, water sources and fish that may be a major source
of food and livelihood for local people. xvi
Also existing forests are being usurped by corporations and foreign countries in
the name of carbon offsets: ‘Projects in countries such as Uganda and Ecuador have
already led to thousands of local communities dependant on forest areas being forced
off their land as private Northern corporations backed by their governments, engage
in a worldwide land-grab at wholesale prices.’xvii
Within Australia, emission permits are likely to be bought up by the wealthiest
companies and also speculators, rather than those producing products that the
community values most highly nor those that provide the best employment
opportunities.
However the greatest impact on social equity is likely to be the impact of global
warming that will result from the ineffectiveness of emissions trading. The Dutch
research institute RIVM calculates that by allowing emissions trading the actual
reductions in greenhouse gases will be far less than one percent.xviii This failure to
make significant reductions will have grave consequences for millions of people around
the world. A study published in the prestigious science magazine Nature reports that
climate change is causing a dramatic increase in deaths because it is causing
increased malaria, malnutrition and diarrhoea in the poorest nations.xix The World
Health Organisation (WHO) reported that in 2000 ‘more than 150,000 premature
deaths were attributed to various climate change impacts’ as well as 5 million
illnesses. It estimates that this annual toll will double by 2030.xx
We know that low-lying island states are at risk. UN scientists have also warned
that the severe droughts experienced in 2005 could become a semi-permanent
phenomenon as a result of climate change and that one in six countries are short of
food as a result of these.xxi The UN has also predicted that as soon as 2010 there could
be ‘50 million refugees’, that is people who have been displaced from their homes by
environmental problems such as drought, deforestation and soil degradation.xxii
Why do we put so much faith in the market to solve environmental problems? Why do
we assume that increasing the cost of fossil fuel emissions will reduce their use rather
than just increase everyone’s cost of living, something that has most impact on the
poor and those on set incomes?
Petrol prices have doubled in the past few years, causing much pain to individual
and company budgets. Yet petrol usage has not declined significantly. There has been
no mass shift to public transport, no major decline in car sales, no flood of affordable
hybrid and electric cars onto the market. Why? Because the market has not been able
to provide the alternatives required. Large scale investment in public transport
systems and cycleways, land-use planning, car emission standards, require
government investment and intervention in the market.

Why then do we suppose that an emissions trading system will work? It hasn’t
worked in Europe, why should it work here where the commitment to environmental
protection is weaker?
We are fooling ourselves if we think there is a cheap solution to global warming.
On the one hand we can pay through taxes for cooperative planned investment and
suffer the higher prices that strong government regulation may result in. This way we
will be paying directly for the changes we want.
On the other hand we can pay higher prices in the hope that the market will
come up with the right sort of investments and changes. In this case we are likely to
be paying escalating prices as the price of carbon becomes a market commodity subject
to financial speculation, but with minimal and uncertain environmental benefits.
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